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Does the Millennium Challenge Corporation reinforce capitalist power 
structures or empower citizens?   
 
In development practice, how does ‘mutual benefit’ accrue, and to whom?  China 
criticises America for perpetuating capitalist power relations and claims it can 
seek a new geo-political order based on South-South cooperation.  Meanwhile, 
there has been an extraordinary shift of emphasis toward the private sector as a 
driver of development, but this shift is attracting increasing criticism.  The 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) - the only development agency to 
grow in influence under the Trump administration - is evaluated in the light of 
these two key themes.  Neither China nor the private sector are successful in 
achieving ‘mutual benefit’ for ordinary citizens – both replicate existing power 
inequalities.  As with the rise of both China and the private sector, the MCC also 
enmeshes developing countries further into the existing neoliberal capitalist 
structures. However, the advantages of the agency should not be dismissed 
outright, as its Ruling Justly and Investing in People indicators can enhance the 
capacity of citizens to challenge these power structures themselves.  
Keywords: Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC); deep marketisation; 
aid and conditionality; private sector-led growth; South-South 
Development Cooperation (SSC); China. 
 
Introduction 
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is the only US development agency 
with the potential to grow in influence under the Trump administration.  Republican 
senators and agencies argue that the MCC could become the lead development agency 
of the United States.1  This growing influence of the MCC is taking place during a 
‘paradigm shift’ in foreign aid and development cooperation.2  Mawdsley et al identify 
two key themes in this move away from an ‘aid effectiveness paradigm’ to the 
emergence of a new ‘development effectiveness’ paradigm, both of which impact on the 
future of the MCC.3  The first of these themes is the focus on the private sector as a key 
development actor.  The second theme is the increased incorporation of the 
(re)emerging powers in the shifting aid architecture.  This paper evaluates the role of the 
  
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in the light of these two trends in 
development assistance: one a theoretical challenge, the other empirical.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development 
Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), representing the ‘western’ or ‘traditional’ group 
of donors, clearly reflects this first paradigm shift in development practice towards state 
support of the private sector.  There is an increased focus on how the state can create 
optimal conditions for the private sector to achieve the neoliberal end goal of a global 
market.4  The MCC also supports the private sector to achieve economic growth.  As the 
influence of the private sector has grown, there has been a renewed emphasis on 
challenging it, and on exploring the power relations which underpin the ‘western’ or 
‘traditional’ donors as authors of the development agenda.   
This paper explores this theoretical challenge by evaluating the role of the MCC 
in the light of two contrasting approaches to development finance.  The mainstream 
‘Financing for Development’ (FfD) perspective views underdevelopment as a lack of 
resources.  In FfD, addressing this ‘financing gap’ is key to addressing poverty.  The 
contrasting paradigm is what Hudson terms a ‘Political Economy of Finance’ (PEF) 
framework.5  This approach sees the financial system as a mechanism of social control, 
which preserves and reproduces underlying power structures.  PEF views aid as an 
attempt to embed the capitalist system across the developing world.  The development 
agenda’s shift in emphasis towards the primacy of the private sector has led to an 
extraordinary privileging of private interests, a process labelled the ‘deep marketisation 
of development.’6   
The second theme examines the reimagining of the role of the (re)emerging 
powers as development actors – this paper focuses specifically on China.  The rise of 
China is viewed as an empirical challenge to the influence of the MCC due to the way it 
characterizes itself as offering an alternative to underlying and embedded power 
structures.  China frames its increasingly influential role as a development actor in 
terms of ‘South-South Cooperation’ (SSC), based on principles of mutual respect and 
mutual benefit.7  Beijing accuses the traditional ‘western’ donors of perpetuating 
colonial power relationships, and asserts that it will seek a new geo-political order, 
challenging the power structures that subjugate poorer countries.8  Indeed, development 
partners in Africa have welcomed China as representing an alternative to the traditional 
approach to development aid.  At the opening of the Chinese-funded and Chinese-built 
$200 million African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, former Ethiopian prime 
  
minister Meles Zenawi commented that, ‘[China’s] commitment for a win-win 
partnership with Africa is one of the reasons for the beginning of the African 
renaissance.’9  The PEF approach accuses the West of using development finance as a 
tool of control.  In Beijing’s narrative China can wrest that control back, and return it to 
its SSC partners in the ‘developing’ world.  This study explores the extent to which 
China does indeed pose an alternative to both the widely held neoliberal agenda and the 
specific influence of the MCC.   
 
Theoretical Framework: Finance for Development (FfD) vs Political Economy of 
Finance (PEF) 
This study evaluates the MCC in light of two competing paradigms concerning the 
relationship between finance and development.10  The Finance for Development (FfD) 
approach is the mainstream perspective in the current development narrative.11  This 
perspective presents underdevelopment largely as a lack of capital and resources, and 
these resources are seen as politically neutral – money is seen simply as a unit of 
account.  The key question from an FfD perspective is how to fill this ‘financing gap’.  
This approach can trace its roots back to the early days of the ‘financing gap’ model 
which argues that Official Development Assistance (ODA) should be used to plug the 
gap between a country’s investment requirements and the finance it has at its disposal.12  
Jeffery Sachs has long argued that to escape the ‘poverty trap’ an external injection of 
capital is necessary.  He argues that development programmes can only succeed if 
sufficient ODA finance is provided.  To this end, rich countries should honour their 
commitments to ringfence 0.7 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) for ODA. 13  On 
the global stage, this perspective became manifest in March 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico 
at the first United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development: ‘For 
many countries in Africa…ODA is still the largest source of external financing and is 
critical to the achievement of the development goals.’14  This theoretical approach poses 
questions such as whether aid or private capital flows are preferable, and whether 
liberalization or strong institutions will be the most effective way of utilizing the 
additional resources.  But whichever way it is approached, what is needed is a ‘big 
push’ of resources to kick-start development, in order that countries can be incorporated 
into the international financial system.15   
The philosophy of the MCC falls squarely into the FfD theoretical framework.  
The MCC describes its role in terms of a ‘mutually accountable partnership’ in which 
  
partner country governments take the lead in setting priorities for MCC investments, but 
it rejects the notion of challenging existing power relationships.  On the contrary, the 
Threshold and Compact programmes16 are designed to achieve development by 
economic growth, achieved through ever deeper integration into the global financial and 
economic systems. 
The competing paradigm is termed the Political Economy of Finance (PEF).17  
In this view, the financial system is seen, not as facilitating a productive allocation of 
resources, but rather as a mechanism of ‘social control’ and exploitation, vital for the 
‘reproduction of capitalist inequalities’.18  Money is far from politically neutral.  It is a 
social construct – created through moral, social and political relations.  This perspective 
sees development finance in terms of a source of coercive power, functioning in much 
the same way as economic sanctions.  The goal of integrating developing countries 
deeper into the international financial markets is not beneficial or benign.  Through the 
PEF lens, development is not about simply addressing the ‘financing gap’.  Indeed, the 
way in which this finance is provided can serve to embed recipients further into a 
system which is predicated on their political and economic disempowerment.  Critics of 
the FfD approach view the engagement of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
as contributing to a neoliberal agenda in which greater liberalization of capital flows is a 
key aim.19   
 The PEF perspective of development finance draws on the arguments as 
proposed in Hayter’s classic Aid as Imperialism20 in which aid is provided to extend and 
preserve the capitalist system in the developing world.21  Today, a combination of 
factors has seen a resurgence in the influence of this radical critique.  Growing levels of 
inequality, particularly within countries, have led to questions about the efficacy of the 
neoliberal project and its ability to distribute the gains of growth fairly.  The financial 
crisis brought into question the ability of the western financial system to sustain growth 
and development.  A growing awareness of the ‘financialisation’ of the global economy, 
in which productive forms of capital accumulation have been replaced with ever greater 
levels of financial capital accumulation, is causing increasing concern. 22  This is 
exacerbated by the way in which this drive towards financialisation is attempting to 
incorporate previously disengaged territories into a global system of financial capital 
accumulation.23  Hayter’s assertion that aid is an attempt to institutionalise and embed 
market-based forms of social organisation is reflected in what Carroll has identified as 
the ‘deep marketisation’ of development.24   
  
 
The ‘deep marketisation of development’ 
Carroll argues that the development project has not stalled at the state-oriented 
neoliberal reform programme of the Post Washington Consensus (PWC).  On the 
contrary, he identifies an evolution, spurred by the shifting poles of global growth, that 
has ‘changed the landscape upon which development operates’.25  Carroll situates his 
argument as the latest phase of the neoliberal development programme, which he 
characterises as an attempt by established interests to expand patterns of accumulation.  
The first stage of this project was, of course, the ‘roll back neoliberalism’ phase, as 
evidenced through the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s.26  
This was followed by the second phase in which the focus was on good governance and 
institutions which would deliver and assist the functioning of the markets – the ‘post 
Washington Consensus’ phase.  ‘Deep marketisation’, as asserted by Carroll, represents 
the third phase of the neoliberal development policy of instilling ‘competitive capitalist 
social relations on a truly global scale’.27  Carroll argues that this new marketisation of 
development both builds on the PWC, but also narrows its focus.  The indicators and 
benchmarks which drive this new development agenda are ‘oriented specifically 
towards the state and its progress towards establishing conditions thought to be most 
conducive to the private sector’.28  This critique is highly relevant for the role of the 
MCC, and its Economic Freedom conditionalities in particular.  
 
The MCC gains influence 
The inauguration of President Donald Trump in January 2017 raised questions 
regarding the direction the new administration would take on overseas aid.29  Trump’s 
budget for Fiscal Year 2018 proposed an overall reduction of 32% to the US aid budget, 
a cut described as ‘breathtakingly cruel’ by USAID’s former director of foreign disaster 
response.30  The MCC is the one institution with the potential to gain influence in this 
new development landscape.  The $800 million budget request from Trump is a cut 
from the previous year of $905 million, but in the present climate it is viewed as a 
victory for the MCC.  Republicans pay significant attention to this institution, and 
applaud its focus on good governance, economic growth and recipient responsibility.  
As Chair of the House Budget Committee in 2012, Paul Ryan proposed the shifting of 
all development assistance from USAID to the MCC.31  During Rex Tillerson’s 
confirmation hearings as Trump’s new Secretary of State, Tillerson mentioned the MCC 
  
specifically, highlighting the way in which it offered a ‘different model’ for 
development practice.  He praised its focus on economic freedom, and the effective way 
it addressed problems of corruption and good governance.32  The MCC is highly 
conditional in the way it delivers assistance, providing large grant finance to countries 
who are obliged to meet strict indicators on: Ruling Justly; Investing in People; and 
Economic Freedom.  This conditionality has made the institution more palatable to 
Trump, who has vowed to ‘stop sending aid to countries who hate us’.33 
With an initial endowment of just under $1 billion, the MCC occupies a ‘narrow, 
but very important, role in the U.S. foreign assistance framework’.34  The aim of the 
MCC is to reduce poverty through economic growth, and it pursues this aim in a 
targeted way.  The MCC will only partner with countries that meet its definition of good 
governance, which includes policies designed to facilitate growth and private 
investment.  In this way, it is easy to see why the institution might fall foul of the PEF 
approach to development finance, perpetuating aid as a form of social and economic 
control.  It is significant, however, that the MCC yokes assistance to an emphasis on a 
government’s accountability to its own citizens through its Ruling Justly and Investing 
in People indicators.35  Evaluations of the MCC assess the institution as a whole, 
looking at the aggregate effect of the indicators, and the possible benefits of the ‘MCC 
effect’.  In this paper, however, the categories of indicators are disaggregated for 
analysis, leading to a more nuanced assessment of the agency and its impact.  It is 
argued here that the three separate categories of MCC indicators: Economic Freedom; 
Ruling Justly; and Investing in People, have very different impacts on the question of 
challenging underlying power structures and on longer-term development outcomes.  
[TABLE 1] 
The MCC frames its conditions in terms of 17 independently designed indicators 
which range from indicators on child health, freedom of information and civil liberties, 
to control of corruption and trade and fiscal policies.36  If an eligible country then rolls 
back progress on these indicators, funding can be, and has been, stopped.  The problem 
with conditional development finance has often been the lack of enforcement of 
conditionality, largely because the drivers behind such finance have included 
geopolitical, security or economic calculations.37  In the case of the MCC, on the other 
hand, compacts have been terminated for failure to adhere to conditions, in Madagascar 
and Mali following coups for example, and more recently in Tanzania.38  This can 
prevent the possible misappropriation of development assistance that often occurs in 
  
settings where aid is provided in conditions of poor governance – a criticism that has 
been levelled at China in the past regarding assistance to Sudan and Zimbabwe. 
The initial request for MCC funding is initiated by the recipient government.  
Because a country must meet conditions before the MCC will enter into a compact (i.e. 
provide funding), recipients are therefore encouraged to engage in self-initiated reforms, 
which have the potential of being more sustainable.39  The money is managed by a 
locally established Millennium Challenge Account team, with the aim of improving 
local capacity and ownership of the projects.  The MCC describes itself as ‘changing the 
conversation’40 about how the US delivers foreign assistance, and is explicit about the 
way in which its work supports ‘American values’.  The competitive nature of selection, 
and the fact that there are genuine consequences for a failure of compliance, are crucial.   
MCC investments ‘align far better than those of other US government agencies 
with what ordinary citizens in partner countries identify as their top priorities.’41 A 
working paper from the Center for Global Development uses public attitude surveys and 
Afrobarometer data to examine how successful the United States government has been 
in aligning its development assistance with the priorities of African citizens.42  Although 
it concludes that the US government is not particularly effective overall in this respect, 
the report calculates that alignment has been ‘dramatically higher’ in MCC compact 
commitment years in eligible countries compared with non-compact years in these same 
countries.  Alignment is also higher in MCC-eligible than MCC-ineligible countries. 43   
It is significant that this alignment is at citizen-level, in line with the findings of public 
attitude surveys, rather than necessarily at the level of government-to-government 
relations.   
The MCC is proud of the ‘MCC Effect’ which describes ‘all the favorable 
implications of MCC’s focus on policy performance—including country-led 
development and policy reform’,44 and more specifically, the way in which the MCC 
selection criteria creates specific incentives for improved performance (as defined by 
the MCC).  Liberia’s improved record keeping on educational data and tariffs, and 
Sierra Leone’s anti-corruption efforts, increased public health spending, reduced tariffs 
and increased access to credit have all been cited by the MCC as examples of this 
‘MCC Effect’ in action.  There is evidence, albeit limited, in the literature which 
substantiates these claims.  Ohler et al found that the prospect of an initial compact 
provided a necessary incentive for policy reform.45 Johnson and Zajonc’s study 
determined that countries who were candidates for Threshold or Compact agreements 
  
improved performance against the MCC’s indicators by 25% more than non-candidate 
countries.46  The MCC shares success stories on its website, demonstrating the agency’s 
impact.  The Armenian foreign minister, Vartan Okasanian, asked for openness in 
election due to MCC funding, and Bangladesh’s minister of finance stated that the 
country’s exclusion from the MCC eligibility was due to its corruption.47  Improved 
irrigation in Senegal was a success, with improved livelihoods throughout the 
community.  Additionally, Binetou Diom Ba, the president of a women’s farmers 
association of 173 members, Senegal River Valley, ‘credits MCA-Senegal for its work 
in convincing residents in the area to sell the land to the women.  “That’s the first time 
anyone around here can remember something like that happening.”’48 
 
MCC – changing the conversation on development? 
‘MCC partner countries exercise ownership within the framework of MCC’s mandate of 
economic growth and poverty reduction.’[author emphasis]49  The problem is that those 
principles themselves, and the related conditionality, are presented as axiomatic.  John 
Hewko, former vice president of operations and compact development at the MCC, 
explains how the use of indicators on good governance and policy choices 
‘depoliticises’ the eligibility process.  But presenting something as a ‘truth’, and 
providing a technical definition for it, ‘is a very elegant form of power’ in that it 
‘appears to depoliticise it’.50  Even if the indicators are drawn up by a third party, the 
lack of acknowledgement that they are ideologically rooted and the description of this 
as depoliticising the process is either disingenuous or somewhat myopic.  The MCC 
focuses almost exclusively on poverty reduction through economic growth as the 
criteria for evaluating funding decisions.  For this to be presented as in some way 
apolitical appears to show a disregard for the debate on growing inequality within 
nations, and the way in which an exclusive focus on growth does or does not address the 
concerns about the way in which the fruits of this growth are distributed across society.  
Underlying power structures, as seen through the lens of PEF and the ‘deep 
marketisation’ critique, remain unchallenged. 
A Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Stakeholder Survey, conducted by the 
College of William and Mary’s Institute for the Theory and Practice of International 
Relations in 2012, concluded that the top two leading MCA indicators of influence were 
Business Startup and Fiscal policy, both in the Economic Freedom category, and both 
vital in supporting and protecting vested interests and current power relations, and the 
  
private sector in particular.  In contrast, of the bottom three indicators of influence, two 
were part of the ‘Ruling Justly’ category: Civil Liberties and Political Rights, both 
necessary to challenge power relations and empower a country’s citizens. 
In the case study of the Ghana Power Compact, signed by the MCC and the 
government of Ghana in August 2014, there were indications that the Ghanaian 
government had reservations about the allocation of political power. The Compact is 
designed to open Ghana’s energy market to the private sector.  A Ghanaian policy think 
tank, IMANI Ghana, argued that, although the coalition of stakeholders behind the 
Compact supported it in general, they objected to Article 7.1, which states that the 
implementation process ‘shall not be subject to the laws of Ghana’.51  This clause shifts 
power from the democratically elected Ghanaian government to the US government 
under the auspices of the MCC.  The extent to which the government of Ghana could be 
subject to external powers in order to benefit the private sector is a clear example of the 
shifting priorities of Western development actors, as argued by the ‘deep marketisation’ 
perspective. 
 The Economic Freedom indicators are an example of the ‘deep marketization of 
development’ in action, and the MCC is a useful tool in incorporating the developing 
world into the unequal power structures of a global capitalist system.  This analysis also 
acknowledges, however, that the additional aspects of MCC conditionality – namely, 
the Investing in People and Ruling Justly categories, should not be dismissed.  In 
particular, the new ‘hard hurdles’ of control of corruption and democratic rights mean 
that candidate countries cannot hope to qualify for funding if these important aspects are 
not addressed.  The MCC would be criticized in terms of a PEF theoretical framework 
for the way in which it embeds actors into a system which is built on their own 
disempowerment.   
What this paper argues, however, is that a wholesale rejection of the MCC in its 
current form risks ‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’.  Existing power 
structures are, by their very nature, closely protected by those with the ability to alter 
them.  Status quo powers will not rush to adopt new forms of development assistance 
that would necessarily risk their own position.  We need, somehow, to get from ‘here’ 
to ‘there’.  By rejecting the MCC outright, valuable benefits are lost in terms of 
strengthening citizen voice (through a focus on ‘Ruling Justly’) and/or on citizen 
capacity (through a focus on ‘Investing in People’).  Power structures will not be 
  
dismantled before the capacity of private citizens is enhanced, and their political voice 
strengthened. 
The MCC indicators in the Ruling Justly and Investing in People categories 
work to enhance both the capacity and voice of the citizens in these recipient countries.  
The examples given above demonstrate that, although limited, there is an ‘MCC effect’ 
which influences the behaviour of candidate countries in a way that shifts attention to 
the rights and opportunities of the people.  The MCC does not address underlying power 
structures at the global level – quite the opposite.  It does, however, begin to provide a 
voice and an avenue of change for citizens within countries, with its focus on civil 
rights, democracy and education.  It is only by enabling citizens in this way that power 
structures will potentially be challenged by the very people that are currently 
disempowered – in this way the challenge will come from the bottom up, as it should.  
The disaggregated analysis of the MCC indicators offered in this paper stands in 
contrast to the narrative of the MCC as wholly a tool of deep marketisation, or even as a 
tool of American imperialism.   
 Soederberg provides a robust critique of the MCC – describing the underlying 
logic of the MCC as safeguarding: ‘neoliberal globalization and American imperial 
dominance…[forcing states to] wholeheartedly embrace the same neoliberal discipline 
that has led to high levels of insecurity in the first place.’52  She characterizes the 
Millennium Challenge Accounts (MCAs – the compacts held between the MCC and the 
individual countries) as appropriating the ‘altruistic goals’ of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and ‘twist[ing] the means to serve the ends of the 
American empire.’53  For those who continue to reject the MCC wholesale as a tool of 
American imperialism, set on preserving the power structures of the neoliberal 
globalization project, there is a possible alternative: the new cooperative and ‘mutually 
beneficial’ path offered by the newly reestablished development actor, China.  
 
China and South–South cooperation: challenging the existing power structures? 
The rise of China as a development actor has led to a resurgence of hope in the power of 
South-South cooperation (SSC) to transform the world order.54  Will China reject the 
current norms that have underpinned the development narrative from its inception?  
Advocates of SSC point to the way in which the OECD-DAC has ensured the 
preservation of unequal power relationships by incorporating developing countries into 
the status quo via a development agenda underpinned by neoliberalism.55  Beijing is a 
  
willing accomplice in this narrative, with the Ministry of Commerce highlighting the 
western countries’ ‘exploitation of African resources, trade of African people, 
occupation of African land and destruction of African culture’ as the ‘essence of 
colonialism’ and arguing that it is China, not the West, that has provided support for 
Africa’s economic and social development.56  Beijing’s most recent White Paper on 
Foreign Aid reiterated the basic principles of China’s foreign assistance: ‘mutual 
respect, equality, keeping promise, mutual benefits and win-win.’57  ‘Keeping promise’ 
is a more recent addition, but ‘mutual respect’ and ‘mutual benefit’ are a constant theme 
in China’s narrative of its foreign assistance provision, often presented in pointed 
contrast to the colonial history of the West. 
Beijing accuses Western donors of perpetuating colonial power relationships and 
argues that it is now in a position of power from which it can address these structural 
inequalities by treating African interlocutors as equals, privileging their priorities in a 
way the West never attempted.  The State-run China Daily highlights the success of the 
Africa-China relationship, pointing out that developing countries seek a new geo-
political and economic order.58  Statements such as these align China’s rhetoric on its 
cooperation with Africa with the radical PEF paradigm, in a way that makes it an 
extremely attractive development partner to African politicians, many of whom have 
had their fill of western pedagogy and lecturing.59   
 
China and Africa: cooperation and mutual benefit 
China situates its engagement on the African continent in line with the South-South 
cooperation model, highlighting government-to-government engagement as equals.60  
Beijing has cemented this approach with concrete initiatives such as the Forum on 
Chinese African Cooperation (FOCAC), and with a broad programme of high profile, 
high-level visits, coordinated around Beijing’s ‘461’ approach. 61   
The close ties on a more personal level between high-level governmental 
personnel from both China and Africa, as facilitated by regular communication and 
face-to-face meetings, have provided the opportunity for the African voice to be heard 
more clearly.  The most recent Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Johannesburg 
Action Plan (2016-2018), resulting from the FOCAC held in South Africa in December 
2015, illustrates this increased responsiveness to African priorities.  Although 
infrastructure remains a top priority, African governments have been keen to move 
away from this exclusive focus, highlighting, in particular, their need for agricultural 
  
development and wider structural reform in order to support job creation and 
manufacturing.  Under the section of the Plan entitled ‘Economic Cooperation’, the first 
sub-section is concerned with Agriculture and Food Security, detailing a range of 
initiatives designed to address agricultural modernization and sharing of agricultural 
research and technology.  This is followed by a focus on Industrial Capacity 
Cooperation, including a US$10 billion China-Africa Production Capacity Fund.  
Infrastructure Development is dealt with in the third sub-section, after Agriculture and 
Industrial cooperation, which reflects the influence of African priorities in shifting the 
primary focus away from a narrow spotlight on tied aid infrastructure development to 
include agricultural and industrial reform.   
China will provide assistance even in areas of its own strategic interest.  The 
United States began formal dispute proceedings with China in the World Trade 
Organisation over China’s domestic support measures for its agricultural sector.62  
Within weeks of the dispute being filed, however, Chinese Minister of Agriculture Han 
Changfu announced a US$60 million grant to support Sudanese agriculture, and 
reiterated that China will not charge import fees on goods that meet specified technical 
requirements.63  China is also rolling out its Chinese Agricultural Technology Centres – 
currently in 23 countries and funded under the Ministry of Commerce’s aid programme, 
which provide technology transfer and training.64  The African priority for training and 
technical improvement does appear to have been addressed more comprehensively by 
Chinese engagement than by western initiatives, with more than 10,000 African 
government officials being trained in China, many in agriculture.65  
In the area of industrialization, too, China’s initiation of the China-Africa 
Production Capacity Fund was realized in January 2016.  There is huge scope for Africa 
to benefit from increased industrialization.  It is currently largely excluded from global 
value chains, and only provides 4 per cent of the global value added in manufacturing.66  
China is aiming to move to more capital-intensive processes.  Although the natural shift 
of these jobs would be to China’s less developed neighbours, even a small percentage 
being moved across to Africa would make a significant difference to the continent, 
given Africa’s extremely low starting point.  The possibilities of technology transfer, 
training and industrial cooperation could tackle structural issues of development, 
Beijing would argue, in a way that western development initiatives never have.  A 
number of African government leaders have been quick to confirm that China is doing 
  
what the ex-colonial powers have failed to do in the past: help Africa out of poverty. As 
President Uhuru Kenyatta has argued: 
The perception that China is the new colonizer is a complete misrepresentation 
of Beijing's activities here in Africa. Achievement of mutual benefits is the basis 
of Sino-African cooperation.67 
 
Chinese development finance: not the same as aid 
It is important to recognize Chinese activity as something other than ‘aid’.  An 
illustrative example of the way in which this process works are the loans provided to the 
Chinese multinational telecommunications equipment company ZTE by China’s ExIm 
bank and the Chinese Development Bank.  The three medium-term financing 
agreements, provided by these state lenders in 2005, 2009 and 2012, offered a $20 
billion line of credit.  This then enabled ZTE to secure contracts and offer their own 
supplier credits, thus facilitating their access to African markets.68  This example 
demonstrates that aid structured in order to support the private sector is not the preserve 
of the traditional donors alone. Indeed, Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda, has argued 
that, although aid has been helpful, it does not provide sustainable development in the 
way that trade and investment does, and therefore Africa welcomes this investment, 
from wherever it is forthcoming.69 
The debate about Chinese involvement in Africa fails to give full weight to the 
significance of Chinese companies in shaping engagement.  What has complicated the 
discourse is that this ‘new’ Chinese development model of ‘mutual cooperation’ in fact 
reflects the well-established pattern of any ExIm Bank – in China, the West or 
elsewhere.70  The state provides loans for business, but they are tied, as they always will 
be in the case of ExIm credit.  The export sellers’ credits that are granted to Chinese 
companies are intended to generate business, so conflating them with the idea of a new 
development model is to miss the point.  Chinese companies are often operating in 
Africa on their own terms, and the companies can often be more bullish than Beijing.  
Sinosure, the state-funded Export Credit Insurance Company, has already been obliged 
to cover the loans that the Zimbabwean government was unable to repay, and was then 
understandably reluctant to issue new loans to the Mugabe government.  It was Chinese 
companies operating in Zimbabwe that continued to offer supplier credits for 
construction and infrastructure work when Sinosure was increasingly reluctant to cover 
the growing risk of default.71  
  
 
Chinese development assistance – mutual benefit? 
China criticized the West for perpetuating unequal power relationships and promised a 
partnership approach to development, but it has not fulfilled that promise.  James 
Schneider, editor of Think Africa Press, concludes that the fundamental power dynamic 
behind the infrastructure investment remains: resources are extracted, and finished 
goods and machinery are imported to facilitate that extraction.72  Rather than a new 
cooperative approach, Chinese development assistance in some aspects is a return to old 
ways of aid and finance provision that have proved damaging in the past.  Some African 
governments are building up large amounts of debt and linking their economies 
inextricably to the health of the Chinese economy.  These leaders are ignoring the fact 
that debt flows are volatile, pro-cyclical and crisis prone, and that credit and debt flows 
are linked to the economic conditions of the lenders rather than the borrowers. 73  As 
Chinese projects leave African countries saddled with debt, a new skepticism is 
creeping in to Sino-African relations.  The former governor of Nigeria’s Central Bank, 
Lamido Sanusi, characterised Chinese involvement as ‘the essence of colonialism’.74   
The spectre of default is beginning to emerge across some of China’s 
infrastructure projects, and the problem of corruption that has bedeviled traditional aid 
projects for decades is compounding the problem.  An example from Asia can illustrate 
the problem.  70% of Sri Lanka’s infrastructure projects from 2009 – 2015 have been 
funded by Chinese investment.75  When a new government was elected in 2015, 
allegations of graft were levelled at the previous administration.  Relations with Beijing 
came under increasing strain as the new government in Colombo insisted that debt 
accrued under their predecessors ought to be renegotiated.  The country is now facing a 
debt crisis, with the finance minister alleging, ‘Chinese loans are a big part of our 
problem. A bulk of the government expenditure goes into servicing them.’76  The new 
railroad being built using Chinese funds in Kenya will increase Kenya’s external debt 
by a third. Kenyan journalist David Ndii argues that the railroad in Kenya could have 
been financed through the World Bank, which could potentially have cost as little as a 
third of the Chinese commercial loan.77  In this context, claims of ‘mutual benefit’ begin 
to look less promising. 
 
Underlying power structures remain unchanged 
  
China, under the auspices of SSC, champions a radical challenge to the existing order of 
power, acknowledging the developing countries’ search for ‘a new geo-political and 
economic order’. 78  Its engagement with the continent does not demonstrate this 
objective in practice.  It is, however, important to recognize that Beijing’s talk of 
‘mutual respect’, numerous high-level delegations and establishment of FOCAC have 
addressed an area that had not featured highly on the western development agenda.  
China has shown commitment to many of the priorities of its African interlocutors, such 
as the high levels of training and scholarships it provides, and the significant impacts it 
is making in technology transfer and investment in high priority areas of agriculture and 
industry.  On a more local level, although many local traders decry the way in which 
Chinese traders are undercutting them with cheap imported goods to catastrophic 
effect,79 there is also the fact that some African traders have welcomed the opportunity 
to source goods in China themselves. China is relatively flexible in providing visas to 
those African citizens who would like to travel to China to source these goods.80  This 
contrasts with the EU or the US where travel is made far harder. 
  China’s ‘demand-led’ funding is seen as a key plank of the ‘mutually beneficial’ 
nature of China’s engagement, but raises the question – who benefits?  China’s rejection 
of ‘political rights’ conditionality means that Chinese funding ‘may be particularly easy 
to exploit for politicians who are engaged in patronage politics.’81  A survey of studies 
on patronage politics indicates that political leaders tend to favour their home regions.82  
Judging the birthplaces of political leaders at the first subnational administrative level 
(e.g. states, provinces or governorates), flows of official Chinese finance including non-
concessional loans to that region nearly triple after that leader comes to power.83  Even 
using the OECD definition of overseas development assistance (ODA) there is an 
increase of just over 75% to the region of the political leader of the country.84   
Chinese engagement is neither a simple continuation of the same mode of 
exploitation, nor a fundamental shift to a new, mutually beneficial South-South 
cooperation model of development practice.  There have been movements towards an 
increased level of cooperation and mutual respect – African governments have 
appreciated the Chinese approach to local priorities and an emphasis on shared learning 
and technology transfer.  What is important to note, however, is that this Chinese 
approach is not designed to address the idea of underlying power structures any more 
than the traditional approach.  There is more appreciation of treating the African 
governments as interlocutors on the world stage, in contrast to the highly conditional 
  
‘scorecard’ analysis of the MCC approach.  But the MCC approach does address the 
idea of power relations on a national level.  The conditionalities of the MCC address 
both political rights, civil liberties and investment in people in a way that is absent in 
the Chinese approach.  And a clear difference, of course, is that Beijing would reject 
any shift towards democracy.   
The Millennium Challenge Corporation’s strict conditionality is a distillation of 
everything a Political Economy of Finance (PEF) approach would reject, tying African 
governments deeper into the power relations as dictated by the West, through strict 
adherence to the neoliberal-informed policy prescriptions of the US.  However, its 
insistence on fortifying the capacity of citizens and enhancing the rule of law, together 
with its inclusive stance towards civil society organisations, could potentially strengthen 
Africa at the level of its citizens, so that mutual benefit could reach across all levels of 
society. 
 
Conclusions 
Those who subscribe to the PEF perspective view the actions of both Beijing and 
Washington as little more than ‘naked imperialism’. 85   It is not possible to achieve 
justice without ‘confronting power’.86  Development finance is a source of coercive 
power, and, to reiterate, will always be tied to the circumstances of the lenders, not the 
borrowers.  However, there have been minor, but nonetheless significant, alterations in 
the development narrative.  The fact that China has provided African governments with 
an alternative development agenda based on cooperation has changed the frame of 
reference.  Local ownership of development programmes has become an accepted 
principle.  China’s approach is perhaps more practical, acknowledging and respecting 
Africa’s demand for increased training programmes, the need for technology transfer 
and practical support in infrastructure, agriculture and manufacturing.   
The conditionality of MCC Compacts addresses some of the key issues of power 
distribution at the level of the citizen.  The MCC scorecard for the Cote d’Ivoire in 2013 
showed it failing in 15 of the 20 indicators, including those on Freedom of Information, 
Civil Liberties, Rule of Law and Political Rights.  In a concerted effort to qualify for 
MCC funding, the government undertook a series of reforms. 87  By 2015, 13 indicators 
were deemed satisfactory and the MCC entered into a compact with Cote d’Ivoire in 
2015.  The 2017 MCC scorecard shows all the above indicators are now being met, 
including all six Ruling Justly measures. 
  
The MCC approach begs the question of how ‘mutual benefit’ accrues – and to 
whom.  China openly criticises America for perpetuating neo-colonial power relations 
in its engagement with Africa.  The MCC Economic Freedom indicators privilege the 
private sector in a manner denounced by deep marketisation theorists.  Western 
commentators decry Chinese investment as exploitation.  Neither approach addresses 
the global power structures that underpin these relationships.  From the point of view of 
the individual citizen, however, an emphasis on conditionality that attempts to address 
Ruling Justly and Investing in People indicators through engagement with national 
governments across the continent could provide this ‘mutual benefit’.  Power 
relationships underpin development.  It is important to consider, however, that 
development must move forward from its current position, with these power 
relationships still in place.  As mentioned, we need to get from ‘here’ to ‘there’.  Power 
structures will not be dismantled before the capacity of private citizens is enhanced, and 
their political voice strengthened.  For this reason, it could be wise for these citizens to 
hope that the President of the United States continues to be persuaded of the value of 
the MCC.   
 
 
1 Runde, MCC in the Trump Era, 4 
2 Mawdsley et al, A ‘post-aid’ world? 
3 Ibid.,  
4 Carroll, Working on, through and around the state, 379. 
5 Hudson, Global Finance and Development 
6 Carroll, Working on, through and around the state. 
7 Information Office of the State Council, PRC China’s Foreign Aid 
8 China Daily.com Why is China-Africa Relationship Thriving? 
9 Roopanarine, China: ‘rogue donor’? 
10 These are outlined with great clarity in Hudson, Global Finance and Development. 
                                                 
  
                                                                                                                                               
11 United Nations, Third International Conference on Financing for Development 
12 Chenery and Strout ‘Foreign assistance and economic development’. 
13 Sachs, The End of Poverty, 218. 
14 UN, Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for 
Development 
15 Hudson, Global Finance and Development, 56. 
16 The Threshold Programme is designed to assist countries that are on the ‘threshold’ 
of being eligible for an MCC compact.  It is intended to support ongoing domestic 
reform efforts. 
17 As defined by Hudson, Global Finance and Development, 12-16 and 71-86. 
18 Hudson, Global Finance and Development, 10. 
19 Soederberg, ‘American empire and ‘excluded states’’ 281. 
20 Hayter Aid as Imperialism, 1971 
21 Hudson, Global Finance and Development, 157. 
22 Epstein, Financialization and the World Economy 
23 Duménil and Lévy, 99-112 
24 Carroll Working on, through and around the state. 
25 Ibid., 378. 
26 Brenner and Theodore, Spaces of Neoliberalism, 26 
27 Carroll, Working on, through and around the state, 381. 
28 Ibid., 384. 
29 Quinn, ‘US foreign aid biggest casualty’, 4-5. 
30 Konyndyk, ‘Trumps’s budget breathtakingly cruel’. 
31 Runde, MCC in the Trump Era, 10. 
32 Lieberman, Tillerson outlines US aid vision, 3-4.  
  
                                                                                                                                               
33 Quinn, ‘Will Trump honour pledge?’ 2. 
34 Hewko, Can the Experiment Survive? 7. 
35 Rose and Wiebe “Overview of Millennium Challenge Corporation” 
36 See https://www.mcc.gov/who-we-fund/indicators 
37 Hudson, Global Finance and Development, 192. 
38 See, for example, Lei Ravelo MCC suspends $350M compact with Malawi 
39 Molenaers, Dellepiane and Faust, “Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid”, 2. 
40 https://www.mcc.gov/about 
41 Rose, Overview of Millennium Challenge Corporation, 8. 
42 Leo Is Anyone Listening?, 10. 
43 Leo Is Anyone Listening?, 17. 
44 MCC The MCC Effect 
45 Ohler Does Conditionality Work? 
46 Johnson and Zajonc, Can Foreign Aid Create an Incentive? 
47 MCC Success Stories 
48 MCC Success Stories 
49 Lucas, S. Principles into Practice Country Ownership. 
50Hudson, Global Finance and Development, 123.  
51 https://www.businessghana.com/site/news/general/145000/Ghana-renegotiates-
power-compact-with-MCC 
52 Soederberg, ‘American empire and ‘excluded states’’ 297. 
53 Soederberg, ‘American empire and ‘excluded states’’ 297. 
54  For further discussion and definitions of the concept of SSC, see United Nations 
Office for South-South Cooperation 
http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/what_is_ssc.html 
55 Gray and Gills, South–South Cooperation.  
  
                                                                                                                                               
56 Sun, China’s increasing interest in Africa. 
57 See Information Office of the State Council, China’s Foreign Aid for full text 
58 China Daily.com Why is China-Africa Relationship Thriving? 
59 Opiyo, ‘Stop lecturing and open up trade’, 2-4. 
60 For further discussion of the history and principles behind the model of south-south 
cooperation, see http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/what_is_ssc.html 
61 “461” is a cooperation framework proposed by China that includes four principles 
“equality, solidarity/mutual trust, tolerance in development issues, innovative 
cooperation,” six major projects “industrial cooperation, financial cooperation, 
poverty alleviation cooperation, environmental protection cooperation, civil and 
cultural exchanges cooperation, peace and security cooperation, and one platform 
‘FOCAC.’” Yun, The Sixth forum on China-Africa Cooperation  
62 World Trade Organisation, United States Files Dispute  
63 African Farming and Food Processing “China grants $US 60 million”  
64 Scoones, Chinese Engagement in African Agriculture  
65 Scoones, Chinese Engagement in African Agriculture 
66 Calabrese, China-Africa Cooperation 
67 FOCAC, China refutes "neocolonialism" rhetoric.  
68 Brautigam and Gallagher, “Bartering Globalisation”, 346-8. 
69 Kagame, “Why Africa welcomes the Chinese”  
70  Brautigam and Gallagher, “Bartering Globalisation” 
71 Brautigam, Chinese Loans to Africa. 
72 Finighan, China in Africa. 
73 See further discussion in Hudson, Global Finance and Development, 193-4 and 201. 
74 French, “China’s Wild Rush” 
  
                                                                                                                                               
75 Jiang, “China’s New Development Bank”  
76 Ibid. 
77 As quoted in French, “China’s Wild Rush” 
78 China Daily.com Why is China-Africa Relationship Thriving? 
79 Lee, M., Uganda and China, 34-6. 
80 Lee, M., Uganda and China, 35. 
81 Dreher, Aid on Demand, 3. 
82 One study found that across a range of developing countries the birth region of the 
current state leader had more intense night-time light than other regions.  As quoted 
in Dreher, Aid on Demand, 3. 
 
84 Dreher, Aid on Demand, 3. 
86 See Lee, “The 21st Century Scramble for Africa”. 
87  Monbiot quoted in Lee, “The 21st Century Scramble for Africa”, 307. 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
African Farming and Food Processing, ‘China grants $US 60 million to support 
Sudanese agriculture’ in 26/09/16 at 
http://www.africanfarming.net/crops/agriculture/china-grants-us-60mn-to-support-
sudanese-agriculture 
Ahmed, K. China goes big in Davos, 17th Jan 2017 BBC Website: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-38644971 
  
                                                                                                                                               
Biryabarema, Elias. ‘New $350 mln China-funded road in Uganda starts July’ New 
Vision (2012) at http://www.reuters.com/article/uganda-roads-
idAFL6E8FR67C20120427 
 
Brant, P. Foreign Aid with Chinese Characteristics: China Releases First White Paper 
on Aid WhyDev 27/4/13 http://www.whydev.org/foreign-aid-with-chinese-
characteristics-chinas-first-foreign-aid-white-paper/   
 
Brautigam, D. and K.P. Gallagher. “Bartering Globalisation: China’s commodity-
backed finance in Africa and Latin America”, Global Policy, 5 (3) (Sept. 2014), 346-
352. 
 
Brautigam, D. Chinese Loans to Africa: What’s the Real Deal? CARI Policy 
Roundtable You Tube accessed 21/7/16 at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nc2nJAUR8jU  
 
Brenner, Neil and Theodore, Nik. Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in 
North America and Western Europe Oxford, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002. 
 
Calabrese, Linda. China-Africa Cooperation: a new dawn for African industry? 
London: Overseas Development Institute 8th January 2016  
Carroll, Toby. ‘Working On, Through and Around the State: The Deep Marketisation of 
Development in the Asia-Pacific’, Journal of Contemporary Asia 42 , No. 3 (2012): 
378-404 
 
  
                                                                                                                                               
Center for Global Development website, accessed Aug-Nov 2016: www.cgd.org 
 
Chang, H-J. and Grabel, I. Reclaiming Development: An alternative economic policy 
manual, London: Zed, 2004. 
 
Chenery, H.B., and Strout, A.M.,‘Foreign assistance and economic development.’ The 
American Economic Review, LVI, No. 4, Part I, September 1966 
 
ChinaDaily.com Why is China-Africa Relationship Thriving? at 
africa.chinadaily.com.cn/2015-12/05/content_22632869.htm Accessed 13/9/16 
 
Dollar, David, Wenjie Chen and Heiwai Tang Why is China investing in Africa? New 
York: Brookings, 12/8/15 at https://www.brookings.edu/research/ 
 
Dreher, Axel et al. Aid on Demand: African Leaders and the Geography of China’s 
Foreign Assistance, Williamsburg, VA: AidData, Working Paper 3, November 2014 
 
The Economist. ‘How Donald Trump thinks about trade,’ 9th Nov. 2016 
 
Epstein, G. Financialization and the World Economy Camberley, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2005. 
 
Finighan, Adrian. China in Africa: Investment or Exploitation? Al Jazeera Inside Story 
4/5/14 http://video.aljazeera.com/channels/eng/videos/inside-story---china-in-
  
                                                                                                                                               
africa%3A-investment-or-exploitation 
%3F/3535886743001;jsessionid=1BA0FAFEF126791B30747164C00DC5B0 
 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Spotlight: China's pledge to Africa 
refutes "neocolonialism" rhetoric 8th Dec. 2015 
http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dwjbzjjhys_1/t1322064.htm 
 
French, H. ‘Into Africa: China’s Wild Rush’ The International New York Times, 17th 
May 2014 
Gracie, C, China's gamble for global supremacy, 27th Jan. 2017 BBC Website: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-38754047 
 
Gray, Kevin and Barry K. Gills. (2016) South–South cooperation and the rise of the 
Global South, Third World Quarterly, 37:4, 557-574, doi: 10.1080/ 
01436597.2015.1128817 
 
Guttman, J., Sy, A., Chattopadhyay, S. Financing African Infrastructure: can the world 
deliver? New York: Brookings (2015)  
 
Haddadin, F. Foreign Aid under a Trump Presidency, Foreign Policy Association Blog 
3rd Dec. 2016. http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2016/12/03/foreign-aid-trump-presidency/ 
 
Hewko, J. (2010) Millennium Challenge Corporation: can the experiment survive? 
Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Democracy and Rule of 
Law Program No. 109 March 2010 at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/millenium_challenge_corp.pdf 
  
                                                                                                                                               
 
Hudson, David.  Global Finance and Development Abingdon: Routledge, 2015. 
 
Information Office of the State Council, The People’s Republic of China China’s 
Foreign Aid July 2014. 
http://ssc.undp.org/content/dam/ssc/dgspaces/China/files/China%202nd%20White%20P
aper%20on%20Foreign%20Aid%202014.pdf 
 
Jiang, Yang. China’s new development bank and infrastructure-led growth Oslo: NUPI 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Policy Brief, 2016.  
 
Johnson, S. ‘China by far the largest investor in African infrastructure’, The Financial 
Times 30/11/15 at https://next.ft.com/content/716545c0-9529-11e5-ac15-0f7f7945adba  
 
Johnson, D., Zajonc, T. Can Foreign Aid Create an Incentive for Good Governance? 
Evidence from the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Harvard University: Center for 
International Development, 2006. 
 
Kagame, Paul. ‘Why Africa welcomes the Chinese’, The Guardian, 2/11/09 at 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/nov/02/aid-trade-rwanda-china-west 
 
Konyndyc, J. ‘Trump’s aid budget is breathtaking cruel – cuts like these will kill 
people’ The Guardian 30/05/17  
 
  
                                                                                                                                               
Lebovic, James H. ‘The Millennium Challenge Corporation: Organizational Constraints 
on US Foreign Aid, 2004–11’ World Development 58 (June 2014) 116-129. 
 
Lee, M. “The 21st Century Scramble for Africa” Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies 24 (3), 2006, 303-330. 
 
Lee, M. Uganda and China: Unleashing the Power of the Dragon, Uppsala: Nordic 
Africa Institute, 2007.  
 
Lei Ravelo, J. MCC suspends $350M compact with Malawi Devex 26th March 2012 
https://www.devex.com/news/mcc-suspends-350m-compact-with-malawi-77829 
 
Leo, Benjamin. Is Anyone Listening?  Does US foreign assistance target people’s top 
priorities? Washington D.C.: Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 348 
December 2013. 
http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/overview-mcc-brief.pdf 
 
Lieberman, A. Rex Tillerson outlines US aid vision, with few commitments to climate 
change and health, during Senate hearings, New York: Devex 11th Jan. 2017 
https://www.devex.com/news/rex-tillerson-outlines-us-aid-vision-with-few-
commitments-to-climate-change-and-health-during-senate-hearings-89436  
 
Lucas, S. MCC Principles into Practice Country Ownership, Washington D.C.: MCC 
https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/paper-2011001093802-principles-country-
ownership.pdf 
  
                                                                                                                                               
 
Mawdsley, Emma ‘A ‘post-aid world'? Paradigm shift in foreign aid and development 
cooperation at the 2011 Busan High Level Forum’, The Geographical Journal 180, 
Issue 1 March 2014: 27–38  
 
Millennium Challenge Corporation website: www.mcc.gov  Accessed Aug-Nov 2016 
See in particular: https://www.mcc.gov/about  https://www.mcc.gov/who-we-
fund/indicators 
https://www.mcc.gov/news-and-events/feature/mcc-effect 
 
Molenaers, Nadia, Sebastian Dellepiane and Jorg Faust. ‘Political Conditionality and 
Foreign Aid, World Development, 75 (2015) 2-12. 
 
Naim, M. “Washington Consensus: A Damaged Brand” Financial Times, 28/10/2002 
 
New Vision. ‘China helping Uganda improve road network’, 30th December 2012 
 
Öhler, H., Dreher, A., Nunnenkamp. A. Does Conditionality Work? A Test for an 
Innovative US Aid Scheme. European Economic Review 56 No.1 (2012): 138-153 
 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Rome Declaration on 
Harmonization 2003www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/31451637.pdf ISBN 92-
64-19982-9 
 
  
                                                                                                                                               
Opiyo, D. ‘Stop lecturing and open up trade, Raila tells the West’, Daily Nation 4th Aug. 
2009  
 
Publish What You Fund, 2016 Aid Transparency Index Launch Publish what you fund 
and Center for Global Development, Washington D.C. 13th April 2016 at 
http://ati.publishwhatyoufund.org/live-2016-aid-transparency-index-launch/ 
 
Quinn, B. ‘US foreign aid expected to be biggest casualty of Trump's first budget’ The 
Guardian 27th Feb. 2017  
 
Quinn, B. ‘Will Trump honour pledge to 'stop sending aid to countries that hate us'? The 
Guardian 13th Nov. 2016 
 
Rieffel, Lex and James W. Fox. Strengthen the Millennium Challenge Corporation: 
Better Results are Possible, New York: Brookings Policy Brief Series (2008)  
 
Rodrik, D. “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion”, Journal 
of Economic Literature, 44 (4) 973-987. 
 
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A. and Trebbi, F. (2004) ‘Institutions Rule: The Primacy of 
Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development’, Journal of 
Economic Growth, 9 (2): 131-165. 
 
Roopanarine, L. ‘China: ‘rogue donor’ or beacon of south-south cooperation?’ The 
Guardian 2nd April 2013  
  
                                                                                                                                               
 
Rose, S. and F. Wiebe. ‘An Overview of the Millennium Challenge Corporation’ 
January 2015, Center for Global Development 
http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/overview-mcc-brief.pdf 
 
Runde, D., A. Milner and J. Santoro. The Millennium Challenge Corporation in the 
Trump Era Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies 2017 
Download available from: https://www.csis.org/analysis/millennium-challenge-
corporation-trump-era 
 
Sachs, J. 2005. The End of Poverty New York: Penguin Press 
 
Scoones, Ian. Chinese Engagement in African Agriculture is Not What it Seems at The 
Conversation http://theconversation.com/chinese-engagement-in-african-agriculture-is-
not-what-it-seems-56779 
 
Soederberg Susanne. ‘American empire and ‘excluded states’: the millennium challenge 
account and the shift to pre-emptive development’, Third World Quarterly 25 No. 2 
(2004): 279-302. 
 
Sun, Yun. ‘China’s increasing interest in Africa – benign but hardly altruistic’ 
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2013 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2013/04/05/chinas-increasing-interest-in-africa-benign-but-hardly-altruistic/ 
 
  
                                                                                                                                               
Sun, Yun. The Sixth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: new agenda and new 
approach? 2015 Africa Growth Initiative New York: Brookings  
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/china-africa-cooperation-
sun.pdf Accessed 12th October 2016 
 
United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation www.ssc.undp.org 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Monterrey Consensus of 
the International Conference on Financing for Development Monterrey, Mexico, 18-22 
March 2002  
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf 
 
United Nations Third International Conference on Financing for Development Addis 
Ababa 13th – 16th July 2015 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/ffd3/ 
 
Waswa, Sam. ‘Chinese ICT Project to Employ 10000 Ugandan Youths’ Chimp Reports 
5/2/15 
 
World Trade Organisation, United States files dispute challenging Chinese agricultural 
subsidies, World Trade Organisation News Items 14th September 2016 at 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/ds511rfc_14sep16_e.htm  
 
Xinhua News, China-Africa industrial capacity cooperation fund starts operation, 
07/01/16 at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/201601/07/c_134987683.htm 
Word Count: 8669 including all references 
  
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
